May 18, 2010 | Print | Back to Library |
Persistence and Recurrence of Internal Armed Conflict
Originally published in Center for International Security and Cooperation.
Abstract
This thesis analyzes factors that affect the duration and relapse of internal armed conflicts. I use a data set containing 173 conflicts that occurred worldwide between 1946 and 2008. I find that ethnically diverse, poor, and populous countries are prone to persistent and recurrent internal conflict. I find that decisive victories tend to be more stable than agreements, which in turn are more stable than conflicts that end due to low activity. My research indicates that peacekeepers are highly effective in reducing the chances that a conflict will relapse. Through a set of case studies focused on recurrence, I determine that countries with a large plurality ethnic group and several smaller groups are prone to recurrent conflict. In a second set of case studies, I argue that exogenous support for rebel organizations is crucial to sustaining many persistent conflicts. I stress that negotiators and policymakers must be acutely aware of the risks of recurrence when mediating internal conflicts. I recommend the deployment of peacekeepers to enforce agreements and the inclusion of ethnic minorities in government, especially in situations at high risk of relapse. Finally, I argue that isolating and neutralizing exogenous support for rebels is critical to ending persistent conflicts.
Full Text & Data
Full text and data available at http://www.stanford.edu/~dcassman/thesis.